Volume 111
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 111,
2006-2007
10-1-2006

No Trespassing: The States, the Supremacy Clause, and the Use
of Criminal Trespass Laws to Fight Illegal Immigration
Michael R. Boland Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Michael R. Boland Jr., No Trespassing: The States, the Supremacy Clause, and the Use of Criminal
Trespass Laws to Fight Illegal Immigration, 111 DICK. L. REV. 481 (2006).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol111/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

No Trespassing: The States, the Supremacy
Clause, and the Use of Criminal Trespass
Laws to Fight Illegal Immigration
Michael R. Boland Jr.*
I.

Introduction

There are approximately ten million illegal aliens living in the
United States today.1 These immigrants come from all over the world,
but the majority comes from Mexico.2 The presence of so many
undocumented aliens on United States soil poses a considerable
challenge for policymakers. Illegal immigration is not a new problem,4
but the issue of border security has taken on fresh significance as a
central component of post-September 11th homeland security policy.5
* J.D. candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University 2007; B.A., summa cum laude, Bucknell University 2003. I am deeply
grateful to my family, especially my parents Mary and Michael Boland, for all they have
done for me through the years.
1. MARK KRIKORIAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, DOWNSIZING ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION: A STRATEGY OF ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT 1 (2005), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back605.pdf; RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT 2 (2005),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A5215D6FF2E06E03%7D/DEPORTINGTHEUNDOCUMENTED.PDF.
See
also
Executive Summary, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in
the United States: 1990 to 2000, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/20OOExecSumm.pdf [hereinafter INS
Report]. That report estimated an illegal immigrant population of 7 million in 2000, with
that population having grown by an average of 350,000 persons per year in the 1990s. Id.
2. INS Report, supra note 1 (approximately 69% in 2000).
3. See Angie C. Marek, Border Wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 28,
2005, at 48-56.
4. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)
(criticizing Congress's lack of "effective leadership" with respect to illegal immigration).
5. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security, "President Discusses Border
Security and Immigration Reform in Arizona," Nov. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content-495 1; Department of Homeland Security,
"Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at the Houston Forum,"
Nov. 2, 2005, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content-4920.
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There is considerable debate over what should be done about illegal
immigration. At the federal level, President George W. Bush has
proposed a temporary guest-worker program. 6 This program would
allow undocumented foreign workers to register for legal status in the
United States, work for a fixed time period, and then return home.7
Supporters argue that a temporary worker program would improve
homeland security, reward hard-working immigrants, and supply the
economy with much-needed foreign labor.8
However, many lawmakers oppose guest-worker proposals, on the
theory that they reward illegal behavior and create incentives for future
illegal immigration. 9 These individuals, who tend to favor a more
restrictive, enforcement-driven approach to illegal immigration, have
offered proposals of their own. Many support stricter enforcement of
federal laws against knowingly employing illegal immigrants.' 0 Some
favor walling off large sections of the southern border." Others have
proposed ending automatic birthright citizenship for children born to
illegal immigrants. 2
Still others suggest giving state and local
6. See, e.g., The White House, "President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker
Program: Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy," Jan. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/2004 0107-3.html.
7. The White House, Fact Sheet: Securing America Through Immigration Reform,
Nov. 28, 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases/2005/11/200511283.html.
8. "President Discusses Border Security and Immigration Reform in Arizona,"
supra note 5. Some members of Congress have proposed their own guest worker
programs as well. Compare Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033,
109th Cong. (2005), with Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of
2005, S. 1438, 109th Cong. (2005).
9. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, GUESTWORKER
PROGRAMS: LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND WARNINGS FOR THE FUTURE 6 (2004), available
at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back304.pdf
10. See KRIKORIAN, supra note 1, at 5.
11. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, HR. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 1001-1004 (as passed by the House of Representatives,
Dec. 16, 2005) (calling for the construction of nearly 700 miles of new walls along the
Mexican border).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that "[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside"). Automatic birthright citizenship
refers to the doctrine by which most children born in the United States-including
children of illegal immigrants-are automatically granted citizenship. See Adam C.
Abrahms, Note, Closing the Immigration Loophole: The 14'h Amendment's Jurisdiction
Requirement, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 469, 469 (1998).
The. extent to which the text of the Fourteenth Amendment actually requires
automatic birthright citizenship for the children of illegal immigrants depends largely on
one's interpretation of the 14 t Amendment phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."
For a critique of automatic birthright citizenship as inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Abrahms, id. For a defense of
automatic birthright citizenship, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and
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authorities a larger role in enforcing federal immigration laws. 3
While federal policymakers debate their options, states have taken
various steps to deal with illegal immigration. 14 The governors of
Arizona and New Mexico declared states of emergency in counties along
the Mexican border. 1 5 The declarations gave the governors access to
state disaster funds, which were used to strengthen law enforcement
efforts in areas frequently traveled by illegal immigrants. 16 Colorado
passed a law denying loans, licenses, and public services to adults who
cannot provide proof of legal residence. 17 Idaho and Kansas recently
enacted laws limiting unemployment benefits to U.S. citizens and legal
immigrants. 18
Florida and Alabama have experimented with a
cooperative arrangement with federal authorities, in which those states
essentially contract with the federal government to help enforce

the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 54 (1997).
In the 109th Congress, Rep. Nathan Deal (R-Ga.) introduced legislation that would
end automatic birthright citizenship. See Citizenship Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 698,
109th Cong. (2005). House leaders did not allow a vote on this proposal. David Crary,
Outcry Over Birthright Citizenship, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 21068022.
13. See, e.g., KRIS W. KOBACH, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE IMMIGRATION LAW: A UNIFIED APPROACH TO STOPPING
TERRORISTS, (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back604.pdf There is
considerable debate over the proper role of state and local law enforcement in
immigration enforcement. Some scholars assert that state and local officers have
"inherent authority" to carry out arrests for federal immigration violations, and that their
extra 'eyes and ears' should be used to assist federal immigration agents. See, e.g.,
Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Law, 8 U. D.C. L. REv. 83, 91-92 (2005); see also United States v. VasquezAlvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Tenth Circuit has long
held that "state law-enforcement officers have the general authority to investigate and
make arrests for violations of federal immigration laws").
Other scholars reject the inherent authority doctrine, and argue that in any event
immigration enforcement by local officers should be discouraged on policy grounds. See,
e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004); April McKenzie, Commentary, A Nation of Immigrants or
a Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since
9/11, 55 ALA. L. REv. 1149, 1157-65 (2004).
14. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2006 STATE LEGISLATION
RELATED TO IMMIGRATION: ENACTED, VETOED, AND PENDING GUBERNATORIAL ACTION

(2006), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/61mmigEnactedLegis3.htm
[hereinafter
NCSL REPORT]. The states have been active on this front. In 2006 alone, 33 states
enacted at least 78 laws concerning immigrants. Id.
15. Ralph Blumenthal, Citing Border Violence, Two States Declare a Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at A14, available at 2005 WLNR 12923139.
16. Id.
17. Myung Oak Kim, New Era for Colorado: Owens Puts Pen to Tough
Immigration Bills Aimed at Identifying Legal Citizens, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 1,
2006, at 5A, available at 2006 WLNR 13247887.
18. NCSL REPORT, supra note 14.
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immigration laws.'
Even local governments are responding to the illegal immigration
problem. In July 2006, the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania passed an
ordinance that it called the Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA).2 0 The
lIRA denies permits to businesses that employ illegal immigrants, fines
landlords who rent property to illegal immigrants, and requires that city
documents be written in English only.2 ' Ten cities have adopted
ordinances modeled
after Hazleton's, and at least thirty more are
22
considering them.
Finally, frustrated private citizens have organized their own antiillegal immigration initiatives. One such effort is the Minuteman
Project. 3 This controversial citizens' group organizes volunteer patrols
along the vast Mexican border, on the theory that if the federal
government cannot (or will not) monitor that territory, then private
citizens should.24 The Minutemen try to prevent illegal immigration by
monitoring the Mexican border and alerting federal agents when they see
immigrants trying to cross .25 In an effort closely identified with the
Minuteman Project, a group of Virginia residents has set its sights on the
local "day laborer" population. 6 Many of those day laborers are
undocumented aliens 7 Local residents have announced plans to follow
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000) (authorizing written agreements between the
federal government and states, whereby state officers help enforce federal immigration
laws). See also McKenzie, supra note 13, at 1157-65 (2004) (describing the Florida and
Alabama agreements).
20. Mark Scolforo, Hazleton Targets Illegal Immigrants, THE INTELLIGENCER, July
14, 2006, at B4, available at 2006 WLNR 12329850. Hazleton Mayor Louis Barletta,
who proposed the IIRA, got the idea from a similar ordinance proposed in San
Bernardino, California. Steven Mocarsky, Hazleton Cracks Down on Illegal Immigrants,
BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES, July 13, 2006, at Al, available at 2006 WLNR
12284629.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Judge Blocks Ban on Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at 14,
available at 2006 WLNR 18925530. The lIRA itself has not yet been enforced. A
coalition of Hazleton residents and public interest groups challenged the constitutionality
of the lIRA. See id. A federal judge issued a temporary restraining order barring
enforcement of the lIRA just hours before it would have taken effect. Id.
23. See Minutemen End Unofficial Border Patrol,but Plan to Return, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 6802149.
24. Michael Riley, Minutemen See Few Migrants; Boredom Isn't Deterring Citizen
Patrols on Arizona-Mexico Border, DENVER POST, Apr. 10, 2005, at Al, available at
2005 WLNR 5661377. See also Matt Labash, North of the Border, THE WEEKLY
STANDARD, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/ContentIPublic/
Articles/000/000/005/970qjkla.asp.
25. Labash, supra note 24 (describing the Minutemen's strict "no contact" policy).
26. Residents Targeting Illegal Workers: Herndon Group Plans to Follow Them to
Job Sites, Then Report Them, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2005, at B6,
availableat 2005 WLNR 17225771.
27. Id.
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groups of day laborers as they travel to work each day, and report to
federal authorities the businesses that employ them.28
The sheer number of immigration-related initiatives described
above suggests widespread agreement that the immigration status quo is
untenable, 29 even if there remains considerable disagreement over what
to do about it. This Comment will explore one state's attempt to deter
illegal immigration by applying a criminal law in an unusual way. In
2005, the state of New Hampshire attempted to use its criminal trespass
law to prosecute Jorge Mora Ramirez, a Mexican immigrant who
admitted he was in the United States illegally.3 ° In that case, the trial
court dismissed the trespass charge, holding that it unconstitutionally
infringed upon the federal government's power over immigration.3 '
This Comment addresses whether the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution permits states to combat illegal immigration
by prosecuting illegal immigrants for criminal trespass. Part II describes
the case of New Hampshire v. Barros-Batisteleand explains the trespass

theory pursued by the state of New Hampshire. Part III discusses the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and how that Clause
relates to both the federal immigration power and the general police
powers retained by the states. Part IV applies federal pre-emption
doctrine and argues that Barros-Batistele was correctly decided. The
Supreme Court's current understanding of the Supremacy Clause does
not permit states to prosecute illegal immigrants for criminal trespass
based solely on their immigration status.32

28. Id.
29.

See, e.g., CBS News Poll, Oct. 24, 2005, available at Polling the Nations,

http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest05m.out 1073&type=hitlist&num-0.
In
that poll, 75% of respondents agreed that the government is "not doing enough" to keep
illegal immigrants out of the United States. Id. See also California Poll!The Field
Institute

Poll,

Sept.

8,

2005,

available

at

Polling

the

Nations,

http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=questO5la.out_2296&type=hitlist&num=25.
49% of respondents were "extremely concerned" about illegal immigration, while
another 32% described themselves as "somewhat concerned." Id.
on

30. New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, #05-CR-1474, 1475, District Court Order
Motions to Dismiss and Objections,
Aug.
12, 2005, available at

http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/district/criminal-trespass-decision.pdf.
31. Id. at5.
32. That is not to say that an illegal immigrant could not be charged with criminal
trespass if, for example, he broke into a neighbor's garage. Undoubtedly a state could
pursue that charge; the perpetrator's status as an illegal immigrant would not insulate him
from criminal liability. See, e.g., New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir.

1996) (noting that New Jersey prisons contain illegal aliens because "the state has made
its own decision to prosecute illegal aliens they committed in violation of New Jersey's
own criminal code"). The focus of this Comment is whether an alien's immigration
status is itself permissible grounds for a trespass prosecution, regardless of precisely
where in this country he sets foot.
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Background

On April 15, 2005, a police officer in New Ipswich, New
Hampshire approached a vehicle stopped along the side of the road.33
The driver, Jorge Mora Ramirez, produced a Mexican driver's license
and a forged Massachusetts driver's license.34 Upon further questioning,
Ramirez indicated that he held a construction job in a nearby town and
admitted he was in the United States illegally. 35 Ramirez was arrested
a motor vehicle without a valid license and taken into
for operating
36
custody.

New Ipswich police contacted federal Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officials and advised them that they were holding an
38
illegal immigrant. 37 ICE officials, citing scarce enforcement resources,
declined to take Ramirez into39custody but promised to forward his
information to its Boston office.
New Ipswich Sheriff W. Garrett Chamberlain was dissatisfied with
this response. 40 Frustrated by the federal government's inaction with
respect to Ramirez and other illegal immigrants he had detained in the
past, he decided to pursue a novel legal theory. 4 1 After consulting with a
local prosecutor, Chamberlain proceeded to charge Ramirez under New
Hampshire's criminal trespass statute. 42
New Hampshire defines criminal trespass as follows: "[a] person is
guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that he is not licensed or
privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place. 4 3 Chamberlain
reasoned that Ramirez was "in the country illegally, so obviously he's in
New Ipswich illegally., 44 In other words, Ramirez trespassed according
to the plain language of the statute because he knew he had entered and
remained in a "place"-New Ipswich, New Hampshire-that he was not,
David Brooks, Illegal Alien Arrested Under Trespass Law, NASHUA (N.H.)
19, 2005.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Pam Belluck, Town Uses Trespass Law to Fight IllegalImmigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2005, at A14, available at 2005 WLNR 10935642.
39. Brooks, supra note 33.
40. Id.
41. Michael Powell, Novel Attack on Illegals: N.H. Police Chiefs Using Trespass
33.

TELEGRAPH, April

Law to Hold Immigrants, PITSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 12, 2005, at A10, available

at 2005 WLNR 9310033.
42. Id. The offense is considered a "violation," punishable by fine and comparable
in severity to a traffic ticket. Kathy McCormack, Police Arrest Illegal Alien, SEACOAST
ONLINE, May 4, 2005, http://www.seacoastonline.com/news/05042005/news/40503.htm.
43.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2004).

44.

Brooks, supra note 33.
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as an illegal immigrant, "licensed or privileged" to be. A sheriff in the
nearby town of Hudson adopted Chamberlain's theory and shortly
thereafter detained ten more illegal immigrants on charges of criminal
trespass.45
Ramirez and the Hudson detainees filed pre-trial motions to dismiss
the trespass charges.4 6 They argued that the charges violated Article VI
of the United States Constitution, in that New Hampshire's attempt to
punish the aliens for trespass was pre-empted 47 by the comprehensive
regulatory scheme enacted by Congress in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. 8 State prosecutors responded that the charges were a
legitimate attempt to protect the safety and security of local residents.4 9
The Jaffrey-Peterborough District Court agreed with Ramirez, and
dismissed the trespass charges against all defendants. 50 New Ipswich
declined to pursue the charges further, and today it considers the matter
closed.5 1
The case against Ramirez was unsuccessful, but that does not make
it insignificant. Officials in states such as California, Georgia, and
Florida all expressed interest in Chamberlain's theory and watched the
case closely. 52 The trespass theory was rejected in New Hampshire, but
that precedent does not bind courts in other states. Given the national
attention garnered by the Barros-Batistele case and the widespread
concern about illegal immigration, it is entirely possible that a local law
enforcement officer could try this theory again,53 in the hope that another
court would view the matter differently.54
45. Belluck, supra note 38.
46. New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, #05-CR-1474, 1475, District Court Order
on Motions to Dismiss and Objections at 1, Aug. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/district/criminal-trespass-decision.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)).
49. Belluck, supra note 38. At oral argument, state prosecutors explained to the
court that their "interest in this case is in security. Being able to identify people who are
in our community is essential to the police being able to maintain and keep the peace."
Id.
50. Barros-Batistele,#05-CR-1474, 1475 at 5.
51. Press Release, New Ipswich Police Dep't, Police Detain Illegal Alien (Aug. 21,
2005) (on file with author).
52. Belluck, supra note 38.
53. Id. In Barros-Batistele, the Mexican government paid for Ramirez' legal
counsel, fearing that if the charges were upheld it would establish a precedent for more
trespass prosecutions around the country. Powell, supra note 41, at A 10.
54. The ability of local law enforcement to test the trespass theory would depend on
the wording of the state's criminal trespass statute. Not every trespass statute is worded
as broadly as New Hampshire's. In fact, the language of some statutes seems to foreclose
Chamberlain's theory altogether. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-203(a) (West 2006)
(defining criminal trespass as "purposely enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in or upon

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:2

Therefore, it is important to examine more closely the constitutional
questions presented. Does Article VI in fact bar the use of criminal
trespass laws against illegal aliens? Or, should trespass laws be viewed
as a legitimate tool by which states may deter illegal immigration to
protect the welfare and safety of their citizens?
III. Legal Background
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to understand both
the Supremacy Clause itself and the nature of the federal immigration
power. This section will provide an overview of each of these topics in
turn. It will then explain the legal theories that arguably support New
Hampshire's position in Barros-Batistele.
A.

Pre-Emption

The federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers.5 5
That is, all powers not delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution are reserved to the states and to the people.56 The powers
retained by the states include plenary powers to promote by legislation
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.57
Collectively these powers are referred to as the "police powers. 5 8 Their
exercise "springs from the obligation of the state to protect its citizens
and provide for the safety and good order of society., 59 Police powers
are not granted by the federal Constitution, but pre-date and exist
independently of it.
60 Accordingly, the states enjoy broad discretion to
regulate pursuant to these powers. 61
However, this authority is not unlimited. 62 Otherwise-valid state
police measures may not be enforced if they are contrary to federal law.
Article VI, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
' 63
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
a vehicle or the premises of anotherperson (emphasis added)).
55. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
57. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935).
58. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
59. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n of Kansas, 294 U.S. 613,
622 (1935).
60.

See House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282 (1911).

61.
62.

Manigault, 199 U.S. at 480.
Id.

63.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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This provision is known as the Supremacy Clause.6 4 When federal law
invalidates state law under this provision, it is said that federal law
"preempts" or "supersedes" state law.65
Any pre-emption analysis is ultimately an analysis of congressional
intent.66 When confronted with a Supremacy Clause challenge to state
regulation, a court's task is to determine whether Congress intended
federal law to displace state law. 67 Though pre-emption may be
accomplished either explicitly or implicitly, 68 courts are reluctant to infer
pre-emption in the absence of express pre-emptive language. 69 Courts
evaluating Supremacy Clause challenges begin with the presumption that
Congress did not intend to displace state law. 70 This is especially true
when Congress regulates in areas traditionally occupied by the states.71
Federal law can pre-empt state law in three ways.72 The first is by
expressly or explicitly pre-empting state law.73 An example of explicit
pre-emption is found in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA).7 4 ERISA provides that its regulation of employee
benefit plans "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" described in the
Act.

75

The second form of pre-emption is field pre-emption. Field preemption occurs when federal law creates a regulatory scheme so
comprehensive that it "occupies the field" within that regulatory area and
leaves no room for state regulation.7 6 This test is admittedly imprecise,7 7
often leaving for courts the "perplexing question whether Congress has
precluded state action, or ... left the police power of the States

64.
65.

See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET. AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 725 (5th ed. 2003).

66. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 368.
69. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Assoc. Builders & Contractors
of Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993).
70. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
71.

Id.

72. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (1976)
(explaining that "[e]ven without an express provision for pre-emption, we have found
that state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two [other] circumstances").
73. See id.
74. See Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
titles 26 and 29 of the United States Code).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
76. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
77. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (noting that "[i]n the final
analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula" for determining
when field pre-emption occurs).
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undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide. 78
The third form of pre-emption is conflict pre-emption. Conflict preemption can occur in one of two ways.7 9 First, compliance with both
state and federal law may be physically impossible. 80 Second, state law
may stand as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives" of federal law. 81 In either case, state law is
pre-empted and must yield to the federal provision.82
B.

The Immigration Power

It has long been recognized that the power to admit or exclude
aliens rests exclusively in the federal government. 83 This power flows
from several sources.8 4
The Constitution empowers Congress to
establish a "uniform rule of Naturalization, 85 but this is not the entire
source of the immigration power.86 The Commerce Clause,8 7 the
Migration and Importation Clause 88 and the War Power Clause 89 have

also been identified as constitutional provisions granting Congress power

78. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
79. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
80. Id. at 373.
81. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
82. Id. at 66.
83. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (the federal power to
regulate immigration is "unquestionably" exclusive); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42
(1915) (the "authority to control immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested
solely in the Federal government").
84.

See

ROBERT JAMES

MCWHIRTER,

THE

CRIMINAL

LAWYER'S

GUIDE TO

IMMIGRATION LAW § 1.06, at 5-6 (2001) (listing the constitutional sources of the federal
immigration power).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
86. 1 IMMIG. L. & PROC. (MB) § 9.02 at 9-2 (Mar. 1998). The Naturalization Clause
cannot be the entire source of the federal immigration power, since "naturalization-the
process of conferring citizenship on those who have already immigrated to the United
States-is not immigration." Id.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
2 (empowering Congress to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations").
88. Id. § 9, cl.1. This clause bars Congress from prohibiting the "Migration or
Importation of Such Persons as any of the States ...shall think proper to admit" before
1808. Id. At first glance, the Clause seems to lend textual support for a general federal
immigration power. Byexplicitly prohibiting Congress from regulating the "migration or
importation" or "persons" before 1808, it might plausibly be read as implicitly allowing
Congress to regulate such activity after 1808. 1 IMMIG. L. & PROC. (MB) § 9.02 at 9-2, 93 (Mar. 1998). However, the Clause probably cannot bear the weight that this
interpretation would place upon it. "[T]he clause was fashioned to prohibit Congress
from interfering with the slave trade until 1808, and nothing more." Id.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Pursuant to this power, the federal government
may expel or prevent the entry of enemy aliens. I IMMIG. L. & PROC. (MB) § 9.02 at 9-3
9-4 (Sept. 1996).
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over the borders.
Furthermore, apart from the power conferred by any textual
provision, the federal government possesses implied or inherent powers
over immigration. The power to admit or exclude aliens has been
described as a necessary incident of the federal government's exclusive
constitutional power to conduct foreign policy. 9' The power also belongs
to the government of every sovereign nation as a matter of international
law. 92
Whatever the precise source, it is now clear that the power to
regulate immigration is an exclusively federal power. 93 The Supreme
Court has closely guarded federal authority in this area, invalidating
numerous state policies deemed overly intrusive on the federal power
over immigration.
For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz the Court considered a
challenge to Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act.94 The Act required
aliens to register annually with the state, carry identification, and produce
that identification on demand by state officials.9 5 Failure to comply with
the law was a crime punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both.96 A
year after Pennsylvania passed its Act, Congress passed a federal alien
registration law that was considerably less restrictive. 97 It required only
one-time (not annual) registration, and did not require aliens to carry a
registration card or produce that card on demand.9 8 Pennsylvania
defended the additional requirements imposed by its law as a valid
exercise of its traditional powers to protect "inhabitants and property"
within the Commonwealth.9 9 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the state registration act was pre-empted by the federal registration act. 100
Because federal law had "enacted a complete scheme of regulation...
for the registration of aliens," the Court concluded, the Supremacy

90. See MCWHIRTER, supra note 84, at 5-6.
91. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1941); see also Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
92. Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. See also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603
(1889) ("That the government of the United States... can exclude aliens from its
territory is a proposition which we do not think is open to controversy. Jurisdiction over
its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its
independence.").
93. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 42 (1915); Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.
94. Hines, 312 U.S. at 56.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 59-60.
97. Id. at 60.
98. Id. at 60-61.
99. Hines, 312 U.S. at 61.
100. Id. at 74.
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Clause barred Pennsylvania from "curtail[ing] or complement[ing] the
federal law, or enforc[ing] additional regulations" under its own
registration law. °1
Likewise, in Graham v. Richardson,10 2 the Court struck down an
Arizona law restricting state-administered welfare benefits to aliens who
had resided in the United States for at least fifteen years.'0 3 It held that
"state laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits
merely because of their alienage conflict with ... national policies in an

area constitutionally entrusted to the federal government."10 4 The Court
noted that denying welfare benefits to aliens who had become indigent
after entry could deprive them of the necessities of life, such as food and
shelter.10 5 This would have the same practical effect as denying them the
run afoul
right to "entrance and abode" altogether, a result which would
10 6
aliens.
exclude
or
admit
to
power
federal
exclusively
of the
Yet one must not read too broadly the Court's repeated admonitions
about the "exclusivity"' 7 of the federal immigration power. Not every
"state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of
08
immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power."'
The Court has permitted at least one form of state regulation affecting
the supposedly exclusive federal power over
immigrants, despite
09
immigration. 1
In DeCanas v. Bica, the Court considered a Supremacy Clause
challenge to Section 2805 of the California Labor Code." 0 That section
barred employers from knowingly employing aliens not entitled to
residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse impact on lawfully resident workers."' A group of migrant farm
workers were denied work by a particular employer and later sued that
employer. The plaintiffs alleged that their unemployment was caused by
the defendant's knowing employment of illegal aliens in violation of
Section 2805.' 12 The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 66-67.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 379-80 (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)).

106.
107.

Graham, 403 U.S. at 379-80.
See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976).

108.

Id. at 355.

109. See id. at 354-56. Of course, the Supremacy Clause is not the only constitutional
constraint on a state's treatment of illegal aliens. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
230 (1982) (invalidating, on Equal Protection grounds, the state of Texas' policy of
withholding from school districts state funds to educate children of illegal immigrants).
110. DeCanas,424 U.S. at 352-53.
111. ld.at352,n.l.
112. Id. at 353.
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California Court of Appeal affirmed."13 The Court of Appeal held that
Section 2805 was unconstitutional because it infringed on Congress'
power over immigration, by attempting to add employer sanctions to the
list of immigration enforcement mechanisms prescribed by law." 14
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the federal immigration
power did not necessarily pre-empt enforcement of Section 2805.15 The
Court emphasized that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state
statute does not render it a regulation of immigration."'' 6 While
recognizing the exclusivity of federal power over immigration,' '7 the
Court explained that Section 2805 was not a regulation of
immigration. 1 8 Rather, it characterized Section 2805 as a valid exercise
of California's traditional police power to protect the fiscal interests of
the state, and wages and job opportunities for lawful residents. 1 9
Significantly, the Court found no evidence in the language or
legislative history of the INA that Congress intended to preclude
"harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general or the
employment of illegal aliens in particular. 120 To the contrary, it found
evidence elsewhere in federal law that Congress affirmatively intended
for the states to regulate the employment of illegal immigrants.' 2' In
light of Congress's intent, and in recognition of the state's traditional
powers to regulate for the general welfare of its citizens, the Court
concluded that federal law did not necessarily
preclude state regulation
22
of the employment of illegal immigrants.'
In light of DeCanas, a case like Barros-Batistelecannot be disposed
of simply by invoking the supposedly "exclusive ' ' 1 3 nature of the federal
immigration power. In fact, DeCanas arguably lends support to New
Hampshire's position in Barros-Batistele.
DeCanas stands for the proposition that states may exercise their
traditional police powers in ways that affect illegal aliens, if they do so in

113. Id.
114. Id. at 353-54.
115. Id. at 365.
116. DeCanas,424 U.S. at 355.
117. Id. at 354.
118. Id. at 355. The Court defined a "regulation of immigration" as "a determination
of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which
a legal entrant may remain." Id.
119. Id. at 356-57.
120. Id. at 358.
121. Id. at 361 (citing the Farm Labor Contractor Act, 88 Stat. 1652 (repealed 1983)).
122. DeCanas,424 U.S. at 365. The Court remanded for a determination of whether
Section 2805 conflicted with federal law, a question the Court of Appeals had not
reached. Id.
123. See, e.g., id. at 354.
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a manner consistent with federal law. 124 In DeCanas, the police power
whose exercise the Court approved was the power to protect the
economic welfare of its citizens. 125 However, state police powers
traditionally include the power to regulate in the interest of the "safety"
of its citizens as well. 126 Criminal trespass laws are an example
of a
127
state's exercise of its police powers in the interest of safety.
Undoubtedly, some illegal aliens are dangerous individuals from
whom the state has an interest in protecting its citizens. 128 It is but a
short step from DeCanas-allowing state regulation to protect the
economic security of the citizenry from illegal aliens-to New
Hampshire's position in Barros-Batistele,that states may use trespass
laws to protect the physical security
of their citizens from illegal aliens of
129
design.
and
origin
unknown
The Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause does not
necessarily "prevent the State from prosecuting where the same act
constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense under the police
power."'1 30 The Court has also instructed that courts applying criminal
laws, including trespass laws, should follow the plain meaning of
statutory language whenever possible.
In Barros-Batistele, New
Hampshire was not wrong to assert that technically, Jorge Mora Ramirez
was in a "place" where he had no "license or privilege " 132 to be, and that
therefore he fell within the plain language of the trespass statute.

124.

Id. at 356-57.

125. See id.
126. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906)
(defining the police power as the power of the government "to protect the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety"). See also Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405, 494-95 (1935) (affirming that the police power "embraces regulations
designed to promote.., public health, safety, and morals") (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Illinois v. Goduto, 174 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ill. 1961) (criminal trespass
laws exist to protect the public safety).
128. See, e.g., Heather MacDonald, The Illegal Alien Crime Wave, CITY JOURNAL
(Winter 2004), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/14 1 the illegal-alien.
html. See also Marek, supra note 3, at 48 (reporting concerns that al-Qaeda operatives
could use the porous southern border to infiltrate the United States).
129. See New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, #05-CR-1474, 1475, District Court
Order on Motions to Dismiss and Objections at 2, Aug. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/district/criminal-trespass-decision.pdf
(articulating the
state's argument that the trespass charges furthered local government's "undisputed duty
to protect the security of its citizenry."). See also Belluck, supra note 38 (reporting New
Hampshire's argument that "the state's interest in this case is security. Being able to
identify people who are in our community is essential to the police being able to maintain
and keep the peace.").
130. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 500 (1956) and
cases cited therein.
131. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985), and cases cited therein.
132. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2004).
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For these reasons, it is not enough to dismiss New Hampshire's
argument in Barros-Batistelesimply by citing the "exclusive" nature of
the federal immigration power. 133 A full pre-emption analysis is
necessary to determine whether trespass prosecutions of illegal
immigrants are barred under the Supremacy Clause.
IV. Pre-Emption Analysis
As noted, there are three types of federal pre-emption: express preemption, field pre-emption, and conflict pre-emption. 134 This section
will analyze the extent to which each form of pre-emption may apply
when a state attempts to prosecute an illegal alien for trespass. It will
conclude that federal law has not explicitly pre-empted the use of
criminal trespass statutes to prosecute illegal immigrants. However, such
trespass prosecutions are superseded under the doctrines of field preemption and conflict pre-emption.
A. Express Pre-Emption
The first inquiry in a pre-emption analysis is whether federal law
135
has explicitly pre-empted state regulation on a particular point of law.
Express pre-emption does not seem to apply to trespass prosecutions of
illegal immigrants. Nowhere in the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") does Congress explicitly pre-empt state trespass laws with
respect to immigration. 136 Nowhere does federal law explicitly forbid the
application of otherwise valid criminal laws to illegal immigrants who
violate them. 37 Nor does federal law explicitly pre-empt any and all
state regulation that in some way affects immigrants. 138 Therefore,
federal law does not explicitly pre-empt trespass prosecutions of illegal
immigrants.

133. This is especially true in light of the established presumption against inferring
pre-emption. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
134. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). The
Court has recognized that field pre-emption and conflict pre-emption are not "rigidly
distinct"; field pre-emption may be understood as a form of conflict pre-emption. Id. at
372, n. 6. Nevertheless, for purposes of analytical clarity this Comment will treat it as a
separate category.
135. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (noting that
"absent explicit pre-emptive language, [the Court has] recognized at least two types of
implied pre-emption").
136. Barros-Batistele,#05-CR-1474, 1475 at 3.
137. See, e.g., New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 1996).
138. Barros-Batistele,#05-CR-1474, 1475 at 3.
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FieldPre-Emption

Field pre-emption occurs when Congress "occupies the field" by
regulating so extensively in a particular area as to divest the states of
power to complement the federal scheme. 139
While Congress
undoubtedly possesses the power to pre-empt state regulation, it is not
always clear whether Congress has exercised that power in a particular
case. 14 Courts should infer field pre-emption only if the "scheme of
federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.' ' 141
The scheme created by federal law to sanction unlawful presence in
the United States is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for states to supplement it. The
INA represents a "comprehensive and complete code covering all
aspects of admission of aliens to this country."' 42 This necessarily
includes penalties for attempting to enter and remain in the United States
by ways other than those prescribed by law. Pursuant to its unquestioned
constitutional power to set the "terms and conditions"' 143 of admission to
the United States, Congress has prescribed specific sanctions for various
forms of undocumented entry and unlawful presence.
The INA establishes removal as a baseline sanction applicable to
aliens found inadmissible or deportable.144 Removal is the proceeding by
which the federal government requires an alien to depart from the United
States.145 In determining which aliens may be subject to removal, federal
law distinguishes between aliens who are "deportable" and those who are
"inadmissible."' 146 The difference between the two classes turns on
whether the alien has been "admitted" to the United States. 147 Aliens
who have not been properly admitted and are ineligible for admission
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 are "inadmissible."'' 48 Deportable aliens are those
who have been admitted to the United States but have forfeited the right
to remain for some reason specified by the INA. 14 9 In either event, the
139.
140.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
Id. at 67.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13 (1982).
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289 (1904).
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2000).

145. IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK: VOLUME 1: GENERAL
IMMIGRATION, NATURALIZATION, ADMISSION, REMOVAL, AND RELIEF 10 (Stephanie L.

Browning et al. eds., 2004-05 ed.).
146. MCWHIRTER, supra note 84, at 14.
147. "Admitted" is a term of art, describing one who has entered the United States
with the approval of federal authorities. Id. at 7.
148. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2000).
149. IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 145, at 4. See also 8
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consequence of a removal proceeding is the same:50 a legally enforceable
order to physically depart from the United States.1
As a general rule, aliens who lack proper documentation are
inadmissible 15' and thus removable. But the INA provides ways for
certain aliens lacking documentation to avoid removal, and prescribes
detailed procedures and conditions for each form of relief. First, the INA
allows an alien not yet admitted but who appears to be inadmissible to
escape removal by withdrawing his application for admission and
departing immediately.152 Second, the INA provides for "voluntary
departure." 153 Unless the alien is deportable as a felon or suspected of
terrorist activity, federal authorities may permit a removable alien to
voluntarily depart at his own expense in lieu of being placed in removal
proceedings.154 Third, even when an alien is otherwise removable for
qualified aliens may apply for withholding of
lack of documentation,
155 or asylum.1 56
removal
Furthermore, the regime established by the INA does not simply
leave removal proceedings to state or federal courts. Instead, it
establishes a specialized administrative system within the Department of
Justice's Executive Office of Immigration Review. 157 That system
features both trial-level "Immigration Judges"'' 58 and a Board of
Immigration Appeals, which reviews rulings of the Immigration
Judges. 159 Those proceedings are the "sole and exclusive procedure" for
U.S.C. § 1227 (2000).
150.

IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 145, at 10.

151. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) (2000) (barring admission of aliens present in the
United States without having been properly admitted or paroled); 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(7)
(2000) (barring admission of aliens lacking valid entry documents).
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (2000).
153. Id. § 1229c(a).
154. Id. An alien might choose to voluntarily depart (instead of being formally
removed) in order to avoid the sting of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). That provision bars
aliens who have been removed from being admitted to the United States for at least five
years from the date of their removal. Id.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000). Federal authorities may not remove an alien,
even one otherwise found removable under the INA, to a country if "the alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion,
nationality," etc. Id. This rule is subject to certain exceptions, such as for aliens who
may pose a danger to the security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv)
(2000).
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2000). The Attorney General may, in his discretion,
grant asylum if the alien proves a "well-founded fear of persecution" in his country of
origin. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
157. See United States Dept. of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review:
Organization, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2000).
159. See United States Dept. of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review:
Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2006).
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determining whether an alien will be admitted or removed.1 60 In addition
to these administrative proceedings, the INA 161also establishes a detailed
scheme for judicial review of removal orders.
In addition to removal, the INA establishes a range of other civil
and criminal penalties for unlawful entry or presence. The penalties
applicable to a particular case depend on how the immigrant entered the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 prohibits entry by deception or willful
concealment of a material fact; 162 entry by eluding inspection by
immigration officers; 163 and entry at a time or place other than those
designated by immigration authorities. 164 It prescribes both civil and
criminal penalties for such violations. Criminally, the alien may be fined
or imprisoned for up to six months for the first offense and up to two
years for subsequent offenses. 165 An alien who enters the United States
at a time or place other than those designated by immigration officials
also faces civil fines of $50-$250 for his first attempt and double those
amounts for subsequent attempts. 166 The INA further provides criminal
penalties for aliens who re-enter or attempt to re-enter the United States
after deportation or exclusion. 167 It also specifies criminal sanctions for
aliens who use sham marriages 168 or business enterprises 169 in order to

circumvent immigration
laws. It even establishes specific penalties for
170
alien stowaways.

The INA also specifies penalties for unauthorized continued
presence in the United States, regardless of the legality of the initial
entry. For example, aliens who fail to leave pursuant to a final order of
removal are subject to criminal penalties, including fines and up to ten
years of imprisonment, 171 plus civil penalties of up to $500 per day they
remain unlawfully. 172 Aliens who have agreed to voluntary departure in
lieu of removal who then fail to leave are subject to civil fines ranging
160.

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2000).

161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. § 1252.
Id. § 1325(a)(1).
Id. § 1325(a)(2).
Id. § 1325(a)(3).

165.
166.
167.
168.
purpose

Id. § 1325(a).
8 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000).
Id. § 1326.
Id. § 1325(c). Any person (alien or citizen) who enters into marriage for the
of evading immigration law may be imprisoned for up to 5 years or fined

$250,000. Id.
169. Id. § 1325(d).
170. See id. § 11 82(a)(6)(D). Not only are alien stowaways inadmissible, id., but they
are barred from even applying for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2) (2000).

Furthermore, they are subject to expedited removal proceedings; they do not receive an
ordinary removal hearing under § 1229a. Id.
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (2000).
172. Id. § 1324d(a).
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from $1,000 to $5,000.173 Furthermore, such aliens are barred for a
period of ten years from seeking certain forms of immigration-status
relief, most notably adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255.74
Considered together, these provisions create a comprehensive
scheme which makes reasonable the inference1 75 that Congress left no
room for states to impose their own sanctions for unlawful presence in
the United States. Therefore, state-law trespass prosecutions are preempted by federal law and may not be pursued even if an alien's
immigration status places him within the plain language of a criminal
trespass statute.
DeCanas does not compel a different conclusion, for that case is
distinguishable from a case like Barros-Batisteleon at least two grounds.
First, in DeCanas, federal law seemed to assume that states would
regulate the employment of undocumented aliens.1 76 In other words,
allowing states to regulate that employment relationship was entirely
consistent with congressional intent. By contrast, there is no evidence in
federal law that Congress intends to allow state-law trespass prosecutions
of illegal immigrants. 177 If anything, the INA suggests Congress intends
for state courts to stay out of the business of adjudicating immigration
status. 178
Second, there is an important difference between the two cases in
whom the power of the state operated upon. In DeCanas, the police
power of California operated directly upon domestic employers;
immigrants themselves were regulated only indirectly. In BarrosBatistele, however, New Hampshire attempted to exercise its police
power directly on Jorge Mora Ramirez. DeCanas stands for the
proposition that states can regulate domestic employers in certain ways
affecting immigration. 79 That is not the same as saying that states can
exercise their police powers directly on illegal immigrants themselves, at
least not solely by virtue of their immigration status. The Court in
DeCanas upheld Section 2805 precisely because the statute was not an
173. Id. § 1229c(d).
174. Seeid. § 1229c(d).
175. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 334 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
176. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361-62 (1976).
177. Federal law does suggest congressional intent to allow states to help sanction
illegal immigrants under federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (allowing states to contract
with the federal government to help enforce immigration laws). See also id. § 1252c
(affirming the authority of state and local law enforcement to detain illegal aliens who
have previously been deported for felony convictions, if the state officer first confirms
the alien's immigration status with federal authorities and the arrest otherwise comports
with state and local law).
178. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) (2000) (procedures described in § 1229a are the "sole
and exclusive" means for determining whether an alien is removable).
179. DeCanas,424 U.S. at 355-56.
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attempt to regulate immigration; its impact on immigrants was only
"speculative and indirect."' 80 Unlike the employment law at issue in
DeCanas, there was nothing speculative and indirect about the intended
impact of Barros-Batistele. The entire point of the18trespass prosecution
was to keep illegal immigrants out of New Ipswich. 1
C. Conflict Pre-Emption
As discussed in Part II, conflict pre-emption can occur in two ways.
First, compliance with both state and federal law may be physically
impossible.1 82 Second, even when there is no direct conflict, state law
may stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of federal
objectives. 183 What constitutes a sufficient obstacle for pre-emption
purposes is a matter of judgment, to be determined by examining84federal
law as a whole and identifying its purposes and intended effects. 1
No direct conflict exists in a situation such as that presented in
Barros-Batistele,when a state attempts to prosecute an illegal immigrant
for trespass. It is not physically impossible for an illegal alien to comply
with both state and federal law. The alien could simply leave the country
until he was able to secure lawful admission. If he returned in
compliance with federal law, he could not be sanctioned under a state
law prohibiting him from being in a place where he was not "licensed or
privileged"1 85 to be. Gaining lawful entry to the United States through
procedures prescribed by the INA would grant him the requisite
"license[] or privilege[].' 8 6 Therefore he would no longer run afoul of a
broadly written trespass statute.
However, the conflict pre-emption doctrine precludes the use of
criminal trespass statutes against illegal immigrants in that the use of
such statutes would stand as an obstacle to an important federal
maintaining uniform enforcement of immigration laws.
objective:
"Because immigration policy affects our relations with other nations, it
must, like other aspects of foreign policy, be exercised uniformly" by the
federal government. 187 Yet it isnot only state immigration law-making
180. Id. at 355.
181. Belluck, supra note 38. Sheriff Chamberlain said of the trespass charges, "[i]f I
can discourage illegal aliens from coming to or passing through my community, then I
think I've succeeded." Id.
182. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
183. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
184. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
185. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2004).
186. Id.
187. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 965, 991 (2004).
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that would raise constitutional concerns. Non-uniform enforcement of
federal immigration laws could have the same practical effect and create
the same constitutional issues as would non-uniform immigration
laws.188
Allowing state-level trespass prosecutions based solely on an alien's
immigration status would frustrate the goal of maintaining uniformity in
immigration enforcement. Criminal trespass statutes vary widely from
state to state. Some states have broadly written statutes whose plain
language seems to allow for the prosecution of illegal immigrants.1 89 For
example, Kentucky law defines third-degree criminal trespass as
"knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in or upon premises.' ' 9 0
It further provides that a person "enters or remains unlawfully in or upon
premises" when "he is not licensed or privileged to do so. ' ' 191 That
language is almost identical to the language of the New Hampshire
statute at issue in Barros-Batistele.
Other states, however, have more closely-written statutes, which
would not seem to allow prosecution of illegal immigrants qua illegal
immigrants. 192 Indiana, for example, has a narrow criminal trespass
statute. 193 The statute lists six ways in which a person might criminally
trespass the property of another, including: entering real property after
having been denied entry by its owner;194 knowingly interfering with the
use or enjoyment of the property by the owner; 195 and knowingly or
intentionally entering the dwelling of another person without the owner's
consent. 96 None of these definitions, or any other definition in the
statute, seems to allow for the prosecution of illegal immigrants based
solely on the alien's immigration status.
Permitting states to pursue trespass prosecutions would mean that
illegal immigrants detained in certain states (like New Hampshire) would
be subject to any applicable sanctions under the INA plus any trespass
penalties allowed under state law. Meanwhile, illegal immigrants
detained in other states-those with narrowly written trespass statuteswould face only those penalties provided by the INA.' 97 Therefore,

188. Id. at 995.
189. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2004) (defining trespass broadly as entering
and remaining in any place one "is not licensed or privileged" to be).
190. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 511.080 (West 2003).
191. Id. § 511.090(1).
192. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-43-2-2 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.7 (West 2003).
193. See IND. CODE § 35-43-2-2 (2004).
194. Id. § 35-43-2-2(1).
195. Id. § 35-43-2-2(4).
196. Id. § 35-43-2-2(5).
197. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (authorizing removal of inadmissible or deportable
aliens).
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trespass prosecutions by states would conflict with federal policy by
frustrating the constitutionally-mandated 98federal objective of maintaining
uniformity in immigration enforcement.'
V.

Conclusion

High levels of illegal immigration have both the public and policymakers searching for an appropriate response. Numerous policies have
been proposed, including guest worker programs, barriers along the
borders, and greater co-operation between state and federal officers in
the enforcement of federal immigration law.1 99 Perhaps the solution to
the problem of illegal immigration lies in one of these policies, or in a
combination of them; perhaps the solution lies in none of them. The
question of which, if any, of these policies to pursue is largely one for the
political branches.20 0
What seems clear in light of longstanding Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence is that criminal trespass laws cannot be part of the
solution. 20 1 This is true even when the presence of an illegal alien
satisfies the literal terms of a state trespass statute, such as one that
prohibits the presence of an individual where he is not "licensed or
privileged to be. 20 2
Congress has not explicitly pre-empted any and all state regulation
affecting illegal aliens, nor has it expressly pre-empted the application of
otherwise valid state criminal laws to illegal immigrants.2 3 However,
the trespass theory pursued in Barros-Batistele fails two other tests for
federal pre-emption. First, federal law occupies the field of sanctioning
unlawful presence in the United States. The Immigration and Nationality
Act creates a pervasive regulatory scheme, mixing civil and criminal
penalties, for punishing illegal entry and presence in the United States.20 4
That being the case, the states are not free to add to the slate of penalties
provided for by Congress.20 5 Second, allowing states to sanction illegal
immigrants for trespass would undermine federal objectives by creating a
non-uniform system of immigration enforcement, and is therefore invalid
under the doctrine of conflict pre-emption. 20 6 State officials may be
198.
199.
200.

See Pham, supra note 187, at 995.
See supra Part I.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (affirming that immigration policy "is

committed to the political branches of the Federal Government").
201.
202.
203.
204.

See supra Part
See, e.g., N.H.
See supra Part
See supra Part

IV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2004).
IV-A.
IV-B.

205. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (when Congress enacts a
comprehensive regulatory scheme the states are powerless to add to it).
206. See supra Part IV-C.
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frustrated by federal enforcement efforts, but frustration alone cannot
justify state action outside the bounds of what the Constitution and our
federal system permit.

